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Summary findings
Carbon sequestration aims at raising the amount of  which both sequestration and abatement can be used to
carbon sequestered in biomass and in soils. Whether it  mitigate climate change.
should be part of a global climate mitigation strategy,  They confirm that permanent sequestration,  if feasible,
however, remains controversial.  can be an overall part of a climate mitigation strategy.
One of the key issues is that, contrary to emission  When permanence can be guaranteed, sequestration is
abatement, carbon sequestration might not be  equivalent to fossil-fuel emissions abatement.
permanent. But some argue that even temporary  The optimal use of temporary sequestration, on the
sequestration is beneficial as it delays climate change  other hand, depends mostly on marginal damages of
impacts and "buys" time for technical change in the  climate change. Temporary sequestration projects
energy sector.  starting now, in particular, are not attractive if marginal
To rigorously assess these arguments, Lecocq and  damages of climate change at current concentration
Chomitz build an intertemporal optimization model in  levels are assumed to be low.
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1.  Introduction
Does temporary sequestration of CO 2 have a place in a comprehensive policy for mitigating climate
change?  Three  arguments  have  been  advanced  in  favor  of sequestration.  First,  some proportion  of
"temporary"  sequestration may  prove  permanent (Chomitz, 2000).  This  applies both  for plantations,
which may become financially  sustainable after initial barriers such as establishment costs  have been
overcome, and for deforestation prevention projects in areas where pressure on forest turns out to be only
temporary'.  Second,  temporary  sequestration  may  succeed  in  deferring  climatic  damages,  and  this
deferral is  argued  to be  a benefit.  Third, some argue  that  temporary sequestration  "buys  time"  for
technical change: in other words, it bridges from a period when energy abatement is expensive to a future
Corresponding author:  flecocq@worldbank.org,  Tel:  +1-202-473-1231, Fax:  +1-202-522-3230. The  findings,
interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed in this paper are entirely  those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent
the view of the World  Bank, its Executive Directors,  of the countries  they represent.
1 Examples  of Europe,  the US, Puerto Rico or Malaysia  suggest  that there is a "high tide" of forest clearance  at moderate
levels  of development,  which  recedes  as farmers  are pulled  from  forest  margins  to urban  jobs (such  "deforestation  Kuznets
curves"  can be found  for example  in Vincent  et al., 1997).  Worldwide,  land-use  projections  show  a declining  rate of
agricultural  expansion  over  the next  30 years  (FAO,  2000a).  As a result,  temporary  (30  year)  protection  might  end  up as de
facto permanent.era when alternative energy sources are cheap (Schwarze and Niles, 2000, Noble and Scholes, 2001). The
present paper aims at rigorously assessing these arguments.
Temporary sequestration delays emissions with regard to the baseline. The key  issue is therefore to
know whether energy abatement and permanent sequestration can be reorganized in such a way that the
total costs of the climate policy - damages plus abatement costs - diminish enough to offset the costs of
the  temporary  sequestration  project.  To  answer this  question,  we  build  a  long  term climate  policy
optimization model in which the planner has both the possibility to  abate fossil-fuel emissions and to
sequester  carbon,  either  temporarily  or  permanently  (section 2).  In  this  model,  we  consider  only
deforestation prevention projects, which appear to be inexpensive and to offer potentially important side
benefits  such as biodiversity conservation, watershed protection and improvement of rural livelihoods
when alternatives to deforestation are offered (Chomitz, 2000).
In section 3, we first apply the model to the class of permanent deforestation prevention projects. We
demonstrate that  sequestration  and  emissions reduction  from fossil  fuel combustion  should  then  be
considered similarly -marginal  costs should be equated - provided spatial externalities are negligible. In
section 4, we turn to temporary deforestation prevention projects, and show these are not cost-effective in
the short and medium run unless marginal damages of climate change are high enough. We next combine
both possibilities in a model where the planner has the choice to keep deforestation prevention running or
to terminate it at each point of time. Both analytically (section 5) and numerically (section 6), marginal
damages at low concentration levels prove again critical for the optimal sequestration patterns section.
We demonstrate the results obtained for  deforestation prevention can be generalized to plantations in
section 7.
2.  A climate policy optimization model with emission abatement and deforestation
prevention
Let a planner optimize long term world climate policy so as to minimize total costs of climate change,
i.e. the sum of mitigation costs and climate change damages. To reach this aim, the planner can either
reduce fossil-fuel emissions or use carbon sequestration.
2.1.  Fossil-fuel emissions and abatement
Let time be discretely indexed by t (O<t<T).  Carbon dioxide emissions from combustion of fossil-fuels
in the business as usual scenario are denoted et. At each period of time, the planner can decide to abate a
quantity a, of these emissions, incurring costs Ct(at). We assume C, to  be twice  differentiable convex
functions, differing among time because of autonomous technical change. We also assume that C,(O)=O,
which means we do not consider potential "no regret" abatement potential. By construction, abatement at
is positive (1) and less than baseline emissions (2).
0￿at  (1)
a, < et  (2)
22.2.  Land-use  emissions  and deforestation  prevention
Carbon sequestration aims at raising the amount of carbon sequestered in biomass and in soils with
regard to the  baseline. This encompasses a very wide  range of activities, including establishment of
timber  plantations,  encouragement  of  agroforestry  and  silvopastoral  activities,  improved  farming
practices, and prevention of deforestation (Watson et al., 2000). As announced in the introduction, we
focus for the time being on the last item which may be cheap in some areas, potentially offers large
cobenefits  and  is  controversial  on  permanence  grounds.  Deforestation  prevention  also  presents  the
advantage  of  limiting  the  analytical  complexity  of the  model.  We  will  come  back  to  the  general
sequestration case in section 7.
Let  us denote ft the reduction, relative to the  baseline, in the area  deforested  during period t. By
definition, this area is positive (3) and cannot exceed baseline deforestation for this period d, (4).
f  Ž0  (3)
ft < dt  (4)
For simplicity we assume a constant factor of proportionality Ti (in tons of carbon per hectare) between
ft and emissions reductions, though the actual factor will vary according to the biomass density of the
forest and the land use that replaces it. Finally, we attribute all the avoided emissions to the period where
the protection took place 2.
We denote CL, the cost  function  of deforestation prevention at  period  t.  This function represents
payments compensating landowners for the foregone benefits of shifting to an alternative land-use 3. We
assume CL 1 are convex and twice differentiable functions which pass through the origin.
2.3.  Carbon  cycle and climate  change  damages
Let us denote elt the baseline anthropogenic emissions from land-use 4. Total anthropogenic emissions
in the atmosphere Et are then given by (5) below, where -rft  refers to the reduction in emissions due to
deforestation prevention with regard to the baseline 5'6.
Et = et + elt - at -rl  ft  (5)
We use the simplified carbon cycle model designed by Nordhaus (1992). The model is represented in
equation 6 below, where Mt denotes the atmospheric CO 2 concentration over preindustrial equilibrium
Lo.  and where Mo is exogenously given. Parameter ,B  can be interpreted as the fraction of CO2 emissions
2 If periods are at least one year long (5 years in our numerical simulations),  we can consider this assumption to be
roughly valid, in first order approximation.  Bolin et al. (2000) indeed assume that, on average,  carbon release is complete
two years after deforestation.  For deforestation  in the Amazon, Houghton et al. (2000) estimate that 20% of biomass is
burned, 70% is left as slash, 8% removed for products and 2% converted to elemental carbon through burning, with
respective  rate of decays of O.lyf',  O.lyf' and 0.00lyf'  for the last three. Assuming equal carbon contents,  these figures
imply  that 28% of carbon is released one year after deforestation,  52% five years after and 71% ten years after.
Conceptually these payments finance not only plot-level opportunity costs  but  sectoral interventions such  as
agricultural  intensification  that ensure  that there is no leakage.
4 We do not impose any particular relationship between elt  and d, as sequestration  may be included in the baseline, and
as the amount of deforestation  the planner is able to avoid may be less important  than the baseline deforestation  for the
considered  year
5 In this introductory section, we present the simplest case where deforestation prevention is permanent. Changes in
equation  (5) when  deforestation  prevention  is temporary  will be introduced  in sections  4 and 5.
6 In this first model,  we assume that once an hectare  is cleared, no subsequent  regrowth occurs.
3which is reabsorbed immediately within the ocean. The remainder is stocked in the atmospheric reservoir
and slowly leaks back to sinks over time at rate 6.
Mt+,=  Mt  +  Et -6 Mt  (6)
Nordhaus'  carbon cycle model is easy to parameterize and to embed in an optimization model. But it
underestimates both short term and long term concentrations (Joos et al., 1999)7.  Nevertheless, we claim
that our analytical results would still remain valid using more complex carbon cycle representations. We
will indeed see that they depend primarily from the fact - accepted by climate scientists - that the flux of
carbon from the atmosphere to the ocean is positively correlated with atmospheric CO 2 concentration.
This is reflected, though crudely, in Nordhaus' model through paramneter  6.
In order to limit the analytical complexity of our model, we assume that climate change damages in
year t depend on spot concentration Mt through a twice differentiable function Dt such that damages at
current concentration are zero. This is a restrictive hypothesis: current damages may indeed depend not
only on the spot, but on the whole path of atmospheric CO 2 concentration. Mean surface temperature, for
instance, depends on concentration history (Svirezhev et al., 1999). It can be demonstrated, however, that
using temperature instead of concentration would not modify our qualitative results.
2.4.  Terminal condition and planner's objective function
The choice of horizon T plays a central role in the model's behavior, as damages beyond this point are
not factored in the analysis. To minimize the effects of this choice, we make the following assumptions.
First, we  assume that, when concentration returns to  current levels  or below, damages are zero,  and
marginal damages are less than or equal to current marginal damages. Second, we assume that  in the
baseline, anthropogenic CO 2 emissions return back to zero at some point in the future as the result of the
diffusion  of carbon-free technologies.  According to  the  carbon-cycle (6),  baseline  concentration  will
therefore go back to current levels at some subsequent time8. Third, we choose for horizon T precisely
that later date. By doing so, we ensure that, whatever the abatement path, concentration is below current
level at horizon T: no damage beyond this date is considered.
If  some carbon  is stored  through  sequestration programs,  however,  it may  still  be released  after
horizon T, hence resulting in concentration increase and further damages. We therefore assume that any
ton of carbon sequestered up to period T- I - the last period whose emissions count for concentration MT  -
is in fact sequestered forever. The costs for T-1, CLT.1(fT-1), include the costs of permanent sequestration
from this point onward.
The planner's objective function is then (7) below, in which 0 is the annual discount factor 9.
T
Min (a,ft)  E  [Ct(at)  + CLt(ft) + Dt(M,)]  Ot  (7)
t=0
Joos et al  identify  two main shortcomings  of the model.  First, the instantaneous  reabsorption  of a fraction 3 of
emissions is in fact much slower. Second, all the CO 2 emitted "in excess" since the industrial revolution will not be
absorbed in the ocean: the law of chemistry indeed states it should be split between atmospheric and oceanic reservoirs.
Ultimately  however,  its sequestration  in soils and in the deep layers of the ocean will lead to a complete  removal, but on a
much longer time horizon  than Nordhaus' model indicates  (Kattenberg  et aL,  1996).
8 The fact that our carbon cycle underestimates  carbon resilience in the atmosphere implies that this time is not too
faraway in the future.
9 If p is the annual discount  rate, then 0 = I+p
43.  Permanent sequestration: equivalent to energy abatement, as long as past decisions do
not impact on present costs
In this section,  we assume  the planner  is able to secure  contracts  guaranteeing  that the land  will remain
forested  until  horizon  T. With  an up-front  payment,  the planner  therefore  compensates  landowners  for the
whole stream of foregone revenues  from period  t to period  T and at the same time avoids leakage  by
intensifying  agriculture,  ranching  or silviculture  somewhere  else from  period  t to period  T. At each period
of time, we assume that because of the heterogeneity  in costs of protection  there is a supply curve for
averted deforestation  CLt(ft).  This represents  the minimum  possible  cost of reducing  the current flow of
deforestation  during  period  t by ft hectares  relative  to the baseline.
We must then distinguish two cases depending on whether these costs depend only on current
prevention ft or also on past decisions f,l-, ft2,  ... ,  fo. For the first hypothesis to be valid, both
compensations  to landowners  and agriculture  intensification  must be independent  from period  to period.
For example,  opportunities  to prevent  deforestation  might  arise in different  regions at each  period  of time.
An expanding  frontier  of low-productivity  semi-subsistence  farming  might be another example.  As the
frontier passes, forest land is converted  to slash and burn agriculture,  then abandoned  to incomplete
regrowth. In this model, each period presents an  independent  new supply curve for deforestation
prevention.
On the other  hand, global land scarcity  may induce  CL, functions  to depend  on both present  and past
protection  decisions.  This might also result from intensification  programs  where the costs of an unit of
productivity  gain rise with the quantity of gains already realized. In section 3.1, we start with the
assumption  that each CLt()  is a function  only of current deforestation  prevention  ft. In section  3.2 we will
examine the case of increasing costs for preventing deforestation  as a function of cumulative  past
10 protection
In both cases, sequestration  is permanent,  so carbon  is never  released.  Equation  (5) remains  unchanged.
3.1.  When past decisions do not matter, marginal abatement and sequestration  costs are
equalized
Detailed  derivation  of first order conditions  for model  (1)-(7) are provided  in Annex 1. The key result
is that, along the optimal  path, as long as maximum  abatement  is not required  (constraint  2 not binding),
and as long as the supply  of "protectable"  forest is not exhausted  (constraint  4 not binding),  the marginal
costs of abating  and sequestering  carbon  should  be equal  (8).
CLt(ft)  = r Ct(at)  (8)
In this case,  sequestration  and abatement  are perfect  substitutes  from a climate  point of view.
3.2.  When  past  decisions  matter,  a slightly  more  complex  equilibrium
Let us now assume that  sequestration  costs depend on both the incremental surface put  under
protection  ft and the total protected  areas  Ft-,  = fo  + fi + ... + ft-,,  with partial  derivative  of CLt  with regard
to f and F positive.  Again, marginal  abatement  costs are equal  to marginal  sequestration  costs.  But in this
case, setting  one additional  hectare  under protection  entails costs not only at present  period  (first term in
'0  The  same  might  actually  be  true  in the  energy  sector.
5the right-hand  side of equation  9 below),  but also at each subsequent  periods (second term).  As a result,
the marginal  sequestration  cost - aCL,/fft  - is now less than  marginal  abatement  costs.
aCLp  T aCL
n.QC(at)  =  (fq,Fq-i)+  t  X  (f  Fq  q)0(
Does it mean more  or less sequestration?  If we assume  that, at each period,  the marginal  sequestration
costs remain  the same  (that is the partial  derivatives  of CL, with regard  to f,) as in the preceding  rnodel,
then sequestration  becomes  overall  more expensive  when history  is taken into account.  As a result,  (i) the
balance  between  abatement  and sequestration  shifts  towards  abatement,  and (ii) as action overall  becomes
more expensive,  the global  damage/cost  equilibrium  shifts towards less emission  reduction.  Both effects
tend to reduce  the surface  of forest  which is put under  protection.
4.  Temporary sequestration: where marginal damages play a critical role
Let us turn to temporary  sequestration.  We now assume  that sequestration  projects  are not permanent,
but defer emissions  for exactly T years. Anthropogenic  emissions  are now given by equations  (10) and
(11) below, which replace  (5) in previous  model  to take carbon  release at the end of each sequestration
project into account.  All the other equations  remain unchanged,  except that sequestration  costs Cl,,(f 1) -
for simplicity's sake, we assume that the total surface  of forest put under protection  does not impact on
protection  prices  - now  represent  the costs of preventing  deforestation  for a fixed  period  of t years.
Et=et+elt-at-1  ft  for 0t￿t-I  (10)
Et =et  +elt  -a,-9  ft +  9ft-,  forc  St ST  (11)
Derivation of first order conditions for model (1,2,3,4,6,7,10,11) is given in annex 2. To facilitate the
exposition of the results, let us introduce the spot shadow price of atmospheric carbon that we denote X,.
Along the optimal path, Xt is equal to the discounted sum of the flow of incremental damages the release
of one additional unit of carbon in the atmosphere would cause.
Along the optimal path, it is therefore not surprising that marginal abatement costs are equal to the
shadow price of atmospheric carbon, at least as long as some abatement is necessa 7 (constraint  1 not
binding) or all the abatement opportunities are not exhausted (constraint 2 not binding) 1
Ct(at)  = Xt 3  (12)
The same is not true, however, for temporary sequestration. Such projects  indeed simply postpone
emissions by X periods, and therefore offset only part of the stream of climate change damages caused by
the emission of one additional ton of carbon. A given temporary sequestration project will be undertaken
only if the shadow price of carbon - and therefore the cost of abatement - is lower in discounted terms at
period t+t than it is at period t. And the optimum is reached when, at each period of time, the planner is
indifferent  between  abating  one  unit  of  fossil-fuel  emissions  now  or  bundling  together  a  x-period
sequestration project starting now and a fossil-fuel emission reduction project in T periods' 2 .
CL4f,)  =  (Xt - Xt+,O?) Q D  for t S T-t  (13)
Factor ,B  in equation (12) accounts for the fact that only a fraction D of emissions is not immediately  reabsorbed in
Nordhaus' carbon cycle model.
12 Equation (13) is of course valid as long as constraints (3) and (4) are not binding. The additional il multiplier
translates  shadow  prices (in $ per tons of carbon)  in deforestation  prevention  costs (in $ per hectare).
6This rule has two interesting  consequences:
*  First, if the shadow price of atmospheric  carbon  rises at a rate higher than the rate of discount
between  periods t and t+'r, then no temporary  sequestration  project starting from period t is cost-
effective.
*  Second,  even if the price of atmospheric  carbon  rises at a rate lower than the rate of discount,
temporary  sequestration  is cost-effective  if and only if its costs are lower  than the atmospheric  carbon
price  difference.
The key issue for temporary  sequestration  is therefore  to understand  the trajectory  of the implicit  price
of atmospheric  carbon  along  the optimal  path. We make  this detour  in sub-section  4.  1, then  conclude  our
analysis  of the optimal  use of temporary  sequestration  in 4.2 and discuss  optimal  value  for  T in 4.3.
4.1.  High or low marginal damages? Two paths for the shadow price of carbon
Rigorous  computation  of the optimal  dynamics  of the shadow  price of atmospheric  carbon  Xt is given
in annex 1. We  propose  here an intuitive  derivation  of the result.
Let us reason backward.  At penultimate  period T-1, the costs associated  with one additional  unit of
carbon  in the atmosphere  are only the incremental  damages  triggered  by this unit at period  T (as T is the
horizon  of the analysis).  The shadow  value  of carbon  at period  T- 1 is therefore  given  by:
XTI  = 0 DT(MT)  (14)
Given the choice of horizon T, we know that concentration at horizon T MT is less than or equal to
current concentration, and that marginal damages of climate change are  less than  or equal to current
marginal damages.
Let us  now go one period backward. The release of one more unit of carbon  in the atmosphere in
period T-2 will trigger damages at period T-1, and damages at period T. However, because of the "leak"
term a  in the carbon cycle model, releasing one more unit of carbon  in the atmosphere at period T-2
actually triggers less incremental damages at period T than releasing the same amount at period T-1. A
fraction (1-8) of this carbon has been reabsorbed by the oceans or the soil. The shadow price of carbon at
period T-2 is therefore given by:
XT-2  =  0 DT'1(MT-1)  + (1-8) 02DT(MT)  =  0 DT-1(MT-1)  + (1-5) 0 
2 T-1  (15)
This reasoning can be repeated, to yield the general form of the  shadow price of carbon along the
optimal path:
T
Xt=  E  0q-t(lo)q-t-'Dq'(Mq)  (16)
q=t+1
It will in fact prove easier to use the backward induction equation:
Xtl = (1-8)  0  t + 0 D'(Mt)  for l <t<T-l  (17)
What does (17) imply for the evolution of Xt  along the optimal path? First, as the discounted shadow
price of carbon is less at period T than it was at initial period
13 (14), we  know that Xt will ultimately
decrease. But for the first periods, equation ( 17) simply states that X,  can cannot rise at a rate higher than
the rate of discount plus 8, the rate of "depreciation" of atmospheric carbon. Consequently, the discounted
13  Indeed,  we have  XT-I  = 6 DT(MT). By  construction  of T,  we guarantee  that  MT < MO  and DT(MT)  < Do(MO).  At the same
time,  we  know  from  equation  (17) that X 0> 6 Ds(MI)  2 0 Do(Mo).  Thus XT-I < B0  and  XT,T-
1 < Xo.
7price  of atmospheric  carbon  can  follow either  one  of the  different  paths  illustrated  below:  rise  and
decrease, with possibly several oscillations before finally decreasing (Figure 1), or decrease from thle  start
(Figure 2).
Which path we follow depends on two elements: the marginal damages of climate change, especially at
low concentration levels, which drives the variations of Xt in equation (17), and the global equilibrium
between climate change damages, abatement costs and baseline emissions, which drives the value of ko.
We will see numerically that the first path appears to be more plausible than the second (section 6). At
this analytical level, however, all we can say is that if marginal climate change damages are zero at low
concentration levels, we are in the first scenario regardless of the initial value of X 0.
T  Time  T  Tinme
Figure  1:  Optimal discounted price  of atmospheric  carbon  Figure 2:Optimal discountedprice  of atmospheric carbon with
with low marginal abatement costs at low concentration levels.  high marginal abatement costs at low concentration levels.
4.2.  Temporary sequestration is cost-effective only when current  marginal damages are high
enough
We can now come back  to rule (13) and examine under which  conditions temporary sequestration
occurs. If the shadow price of carbon rises at a rate higher than the rate of discount between periods t and
t+T,  then it is not cost-effective to  undertake any T-period sequestration projects. They would  indeed
bridge the gap to a period where, along the optimal path, the marginal abatement cost is in fact higher
(even in discounted terms) than it is at period t. The preceding discussion informs us that such a situation
occurs when marginal damages at low concentration levels are low or nil.
On the contrary, if the shadow price of carbon rises at a rate lower than the rate of discount between
periods t and t+-r, then some of the temporary sequestration projects are undertaken up to the point where
the  costs  of sequestration just  bridge the difference (in discounted terms  again) between present  and
future shadow prices of carbon. When this difference becomes too large, all the available deforestation
prevention projects are undertaken (that is ft=d,).
We have seen that the shadow price of atmospheric carbon will eventually decrease along an optimal
path. We are therefore sure that, beyond some point in the future, the shadow price of carbon will rise at a
rate lower than the rate of discount, and therefore that, beyond this point, some r-period long temporary
sequestration will become cost-effective. However, depending on the shape of the damage function and
on the emission baseline, this point might come at the very first period or on the very far in the future.
84.3.  On the optimal length of deforestation prevention
In the above analysis, the length of temporary deforestation prevention X was fixed. Let us now discuss
the optimal value of this parameter. To this aim, let us consider a l-period temporary sequestration project
worthwhile undertaking along the optimal climate mitigation path. This means that the cost of this project
are more than offset by the benefits in terms of discounted shadow prices of carbon. We denote A the
difference.
Does it make sense to extend protection by one additional period? The project obviously becomes more
expensive. But on the other hand, the difference of discounted shadow prices of carbon between present
period and termination periods also grows. The key issue is therefore to know whether the net gain A plus
this incremental difference still remains positive. Two cases are therefore possible:
*  If the costs of extending protection become high enough not only to offset further gains in terms of
shadow price of carbon, but also to offset the initial benefit of the project (A), then it becomes useless
to further extend protection. This equilibrium is defined precisely as the point where the planner is
indifferent between abating now, or bundling sequestration and future abatement.
*  On the  other hand,  extending protection might  even  add to  A  (if, for  instance, beyond  some
threshold,  extending  deforestation prevention  further  becomes  nearly  cost-free).  In this  case,  the
optimal length of the project is in fact until horizon T, that is permanent sequestration.
We now go one step further and assume the planner can choose the length of forest protection, in a
model where the quantity of forest already put under protection matters.
5.  Optimal  deforestation  prevention  for carbon  sequestration
5.1.  Deforestation prevention for a single body of forest: the model
In the  two previous  sections, only  one type  of sequestration, either  temporary  or permanent, was
admissible at the same time. We now combine both options. We assume a unique forest which shrinks by
an incremental dt hectares at each period in the baseline scenario. At each period, however, the planner
can compensate potential deforesters and save f, hectares out of the  dt, adding  to a total  "belt" of Ft
hectares (equation 18) around what would have remained standing at period t in the baseline. To account
for the possibility of temporary sequestration, the incremental area protected at one given time may be
negative, which implies that constraint (3) is replaced by (19) below.
t
Ft=  Efq  (18)
q=0
Ft Ž0  (19)
We model deforestation as follows. At period t, given the structure of the transportation system and the
general demand for agricultural land, we assume an implicit revenue from agriculture or ranching can be
associated with each point of land. If, at the beginning of a given period, this implicit revenue is positive
for some forested patch of land, this surface will be deforested during this period so that, at the end of the
period, the deforestation frontier reaches the point where the implicit revenue from agriculture is zero.
From one period to the next, however, rising demand for agricultural land as well as improvements in the
transportation network shifts this function upward, triggering further deforestation.
9The planner's sequestration policy is a combination of compensations to "would be deforesters" and of
measures aimed at intensifying agriculture and ranching elsewhere in the country. However, given the
above model of deforestation, we assume that at each period of time the hectares the planner is able to
protect from deforestation are the ones which are closest to the baseline frontier, where distance from
markets  and  roads  make  agriculture or ranching  the  least attractive.  This  policy  thus  "holds  back"
deforestation frontier from where it would be otherwise' 4 (see Figures 3a, b and c).
Contrary to the preceding two cases, however, where the planner could secure long term contracts, we
assume here he cannot prevent deforestation from more than one period at a time. If he stops paying at
one point of time, a rapid clearing of the total protected area F, thus occurs. In other words, the policies he
puts  in place  have to  be  renewed at  each period,  and  do  not have  long term  effects. Under  these
assumptions, costs CLt now depend on the total area protected F, and not on the incremental ft.
The objective function therefore becomes:
T
Min (at ft)  E[Ct(a)  + CLt(F,) + Dt(M,)]  Ot  (20)
t=o
5.2.  Two patterns of deforestation prevention
Derivation of first order conditions for problem (1,2,3,5,6,18,19,20) is presented in annex 3. The key
result is that optimal sequestration may follow two different optimal paths depending on the marginal
climate change damages at low concentration levels.
*  When  marginal  damages  are  high,  sequestration  starts  at  the  first  period  and  temporary
sequestration between consecutive periods is possible
*  When marginal damages are low at low concentration levels, sequestration follows a "bang-bang"
path:  no  protection  at  first,  and  then  full  protection  of  all  remaining  forest  (and  temporary
sequestration between consecutive periods is not possible during first periods)
When  marginal  damages  are  high,  sequestration  starts  at  the first  period  and  temporary
sequestration between consecutive periods is possible
We know from the above discussion that, when marginal damages are sufficiently high, the shadow
price of carbon rises at a rate lower than the discount rate from the very first period onward (the dynamics
of shadow price XA  are indeed the same in this model as they were in the two previous sections). At each
period, the planner has an interest in making at least some temporary deforestation, which thus begins
from the start.
What is the optimal deforestation prevention path? Using the same reasoning as in section 4.3, we see
that forest should be protected between the first and second periods up to the point where marginal costs
of one period protection exactly compensate the diminution of discounted shadow price of carbon during
this  interval. Hence the value of fo (and therefore  of FO).  The same reasoning can be applied at each
period, hence yielding the successive values of Ft through equation (21) below.
CL(Ft) = (X,  - t,+IO) l p  for 0 < t < T-1  (21)
14 It is important  to note that there is no guarantee  that individual  plots will be preserved. Indeed, even if one hectare is
protected  at first  period,  rising  revenue  from  agriculture  at this spot make  it more  interesting  to let it cut down at second
period to protect another hectare further out on the frontier.
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Figures  3a, b and c: Three  possible  decisions  regarding  deforestation  at  period t+l .First,  the  planner  extends  the area already  protected  (F)
by an amount equivalent to the area which should be deforested under the baseline (d,+,).  The  forest frontier  remains unchanged, and there is no
release of carbon between periods  I and t+I  (3a). In 3b, the planner simply keeps the total amount offorest  under protection constant (f,.,=O).
There are emissions as the planner swaps areas previously protected, but too expensive to keep protected now, with areas closer to the baseline
frontier. 3c is the extreme case where the planner abandons allprotection  (f +,  =-Fd: the whole surface under protection at period t (Fd plus  the
area which had to be cleared in the baseline (dt,)  are cleared
11In other words, at each point of time, the marginal cost of permanent sequestration equals the shadow
price of carbon (the shadow price of carbon at this  period is by  definition zero  at last period). These
properties are valid as long as both sequestration and abatement supplies are not exhausted (i.e. as long as
constraints 2 and 4 remain not binding).
T
E  CLq(Fq)  Oq-t = X,  [3  for 0 < t < T-1  (22)
q=t
When marginal damages are low at low concentration levels, sequestration follows  a  "bang-bang"
path:  no  protection  at first,  and  then full  protection  of  all  remaining forest  (and  temporary
sequestration between consecutive periods is not possible during  first periods)
When  marginal  damages  are  low  at  low  concentration  levels,  we  have  seen  that  the  price  of
atmospheric carbon rises at a rate higher than the rate of discount during the first periods (equation 13).
Consequently,  deforestation  prevention  projects  which  start  and  end  within  this  time  interval  are
unattractive. They would postpone emissions to a point where the discounted shadow price of carbon is
higher than it was at the start of the project. As a result, Fo, Fl, and all subsequent F, in the time interval
during which the discounted shadow price of carbon is above its initial value should be zero (i).
But on the other hand, we know that the discounted shadow price of carbon will eventually become
lower than  it was at period 0. Consequently, some deforestation prevention projects starting during the
first periods, but ending beyond this time interval are cost-effective. As a result, some of the Fo, F 1, and
subsequent F, in the time interval during which the discounted shadow price of carbon is above its initial
value should be strictly positive (ii).
There  is  an  obvious  contradiction  between  (i)  and  (ii).  The  reason  for  that  is  that,  along  any
sequestration  path  (Ft), and  henceforth  along the  optimal one  (Ft),  the  discounted  marginal cost  of
preventing the emission of one more ton of carbon till horizon T is by construction decreasing with time.
On the other hand, the discounted shadow price of carbon is rising during the first periods. Contrary to the
preceding case (equation 22), there is therefore no way both quantities can be equated at all points in time.
As a result, the optimal use of sequestration is a "bang-bang" solution. Before a "turning point", there
is no sequestration at all (ft=O),  and after this point, all the remaining forest standing is protected (that is
f,=dt) (see annex 3 for a rigorous derivation of this result). The marginal cost of permanent sequestration
along the optimal path is higher than the discounted shadow price of carbon before the "turning point"
and  lower afterwards. Only at the "turning point" period itself do we  observe an equalization of both
quantities in the model of equation (22).
To examine which path is actually chosen, and disentangle the role of the different parameters, we now
turn on to numerical simulations of the above model.
126.  Numerical simulations
To gain insights on how the shape of climate change damages affects the cost-effectiveness  of
sequestration,  especially during the first periods of the simulation  which are the most relevant for
decision-making,  we make numerical  simulations  of the model of deforestation  prevention  developed  in
the last section  using  the GAMs  software.
6.1.  Model  calibration
Fossil-fuel  baseline  emissions  and abatement  costs
We assume  business-as  usual world fossil-fuel  emissions  grow at the rates of the IPCC IS92a scenario
between 2000 and 2100 (Leggett et al., 1992,  figures from Morita and Lee, 1997) with 2000 figures
updated  using latest IEA data (2000). Beyond  2100, emissions  are assumed  to decrease  linearly  and stop
completely in 2200. With this anthropogenic  forcing, carbon cycle (6) predicts atmospheric  carbon
dioxide concentration  would eventually  decrease back to current level in the last quarter of the 24th
century.  We therefore  set our time horizon  T in 2400, dividing  time in 5-year  periods between  2000 and
2200,  and in 25-year  periods  afterwards.
World marginal  abatement  costs are assumed  to be zero at the origin - we do not take "no regret"
potential  into account  - and to rise quadratically  with abatement.  The function  is parameterized  assuming
a carbon  free backstop  technology  initially  available  at $900 per ton of carbon.  We assume  autonomous
technical  change  cuts  this price by half every  50 years (that is by 1.38%  annually).
The discount  rate is set at 5%.
Land-use CO  emissions and sequestration costs
Anthropogenic  land-use  CO 2 emissions  derive  essentially  from tropical  deforestation.  IPCC  estimates
this flux at an average 1.7±0.8  GtC.yr-1  between 1980  and 1989,  and 1.6±0.8  GtC.yr'1  between  1990  and
1999  (Bolin  et al., 2000), with global  deforestation  rates estimated  15.1  Mha.yf  1 between 1970  and 1990
(Dixon et al., 1994). Most models forecast  from very limited deforestation  to fairly important  forest
regrowth starting beyond 2050 as world population  tends to stabilization,  agriculture  becomes more
productive,  and economic  growth  provides better  job opportunities  in the secondary  or tertiary sectors.
But the short and medium term transition is much more controversial:  some models indeed project a
smooth decline of deforestation  over this period, while other forecast a sharp rise followed  by a steep
decrease  (see Nakicenovic  et al., 2000).  Recent  FAO data for the 1990-2000  decade see, to point  towards
smooth decline (FAO, 2000b). In our baseline scenario,  we will assume a median trend of a constant
deforestation  rate of 8 Mha.yr-l  over the next five decades,  followed  by no deforestation  at all beyond  this
point.
The quantity of carbon  released  through deforestation  in the tropics depends on the subsequent  land-
use. Dixon et al. (1994)  assume deforestation  prevention  saves, on average, 181  tC.ha&'.  Sampson  et al.
(2000)  find cropping  after slash and bum of tropical forest release between 152  tC.ha- 1 and 224 tC.ha7'
(with a mean value of 184  tC.ha-1).  We choose  here r  = 200 tC.ha' , which, combined  with our land-use
scenario,  leads  to land-use  C02 emissions  of 1.6  GtC.yr  over the 2000-2050  period.
To model deforestation  prevention  policies, we assume that at each period, households  clear land to
establish  pasture  and cropping  up to the point  where the revenue  they can expect from these activities  (all
13costs included) drops to zero. In our baseline land-use scenario, exogenous drivers such as total demand
for food cause the zero expected revenue line further and further away in the forest, thus triggering steady
deforestation over the  2000-2050 period.  However, we  assume that the  international  community can
divert some of these households from deforesting by a combination of compensations to households and
complementary measures (for instance agriculture intensification) to avoid leakage..
Assuming  that the  least suitable land for  agriculture are protected  first  at  each point of time, the
foregone revenue per hectare is assumed to be increasing with the amount of forest put under protection
with regard to the baseline. At each point of time, the maximum total area that can be put under protection
is obviously the total area that would have been deforested in the baseline between 2000 and the end of
the considered period. We will, however, assume that only half of total world deforestation - 4 MtC .yr ' -
can be addressed through carbon-related policies. We choose quadratic  CL, functions, with CLt(O)=O
(costs when no forest is protected are zero), CL4(0)=0  (marginal cost of first hectare protected is zero) and
CLI(  E  dq), i.e., the marginal annual cost of full protection, starts at $100/ha, rising at a 3% rate until 2050
q=O
and stabilizing afterwards.
Carbon cycle and climate change damages
We calibrate the carbon cycle using values from Nordhaus (1992): ,3=0.38,  5=0.082, preindustrial CO2
concentration of 274 ppm. We estimate 2000 atmospheric CO 2 concentration at 370 ppm on the basis of
Keeling and Whorf (2000).
It has been pointed out that widely used "smooth" damage functions - usually polynomial of degree 1
to 3 (Tol and Fankhauser, 1998) - do not correctly capture the possibility of catastrophic damages which
could stem out either of highly non linear climate dynamics, such as a  slowdown of the thermohaline
circulation (Broecker, 1997), increased frequency of El Niuo events, or of highly non linear responses to
smooth climate change, such as sudden migratory pressure when agricultural supply reaches a threshold
in the subtropics (Parry et al., 1999) or rapid changes in the opinion's concerns about the importance of
the issue such as in the "mad cow" crisis in Europe (Streets and Glantz, 2000). To take these possibilities
into account, threshold-type damage functions have also been proposed.
In the following simulations, we therefore use both aggregated damage function:
n  polynomial damage function, where damages are zero at current concentration and rise linearly (we
will also test quadratic and cubic functions) with concentration. As a benchmark figure, we assume
that double preindustrial concentration level in 2100 would lead to  a loss of 1% of world gross
product  damage at that  time (that is 250 trillion dollars  under  scenario IS92a economic gTowth
assumption).
*  Threshold damage functions, where damages are assumed to be zero until a given ceiling is reached,
and then rise sharply. For simplicity's sake, and to make the link with the cost-efficiency approach,
we assume damages rise to infinity when the concentrations exceed the threshold. We first consider
the 550 ppm target, but we will also examine the 450 ppm alternative.
146.2.  Numerical  insights
Threshold damagefunctions
With threshold damage functions, marginal damages are assumed to be zero when concentration is
lower than the threshold.  In this case, we find the expected "bang-bang" behavior of sequestration use:
no forest  is protected at first, and then, beyond some "turning point", all  remaining standing forest is
protected. In our central scenario, the "turning point" is relatively distant in the future (2040) and the
surface of forest preserved permanently is only 39 Mha out of the 200 that could have been protected in
total (19%). Strictly speaking, this is actually not permanent sequestration: these 39 Mha area are in fact
deforested before horizon T when the discounted shadow price of carbon ultimately decreases. But this
happens  so late, typically  beyond 2160, that  for all  practical purposes we can consider sequestration
starting from the "turning point" to be permanent.
In Table 1 below, we explore several alternative scenarios to test the sensitivity of the "turning point"
to the different assumptions of the model. First, the position of the threshold appears to have a strong
impact on the "turning point". Forest protection starts in 2025 when the threshold is 500 ppm, and in 2005
when it is set at 450 ppm. These results stem from the fact that the  lower the threshold is, the higher
abatement costs need to be, and thus the (relatively) cheaper sequestration becomes.
In comparison, abatement costs in the fossil-fuel sector and discount rate appear to have less impact.
First, even in a highly technology-optimistic scenario - double speed of autonomous technical change -
the "turning point" is just  postponed by 5 years (scenario b). Second, lowering the discount rate to 3%,
which means the implicit "pure time preference" of the planner is close to zero, only brings the "turning
point" closer by 5 years.
Similarly, even very optimistic assumptions about future deforestation prevention costs have a limited
impact  on  the  "turning  point"  and  thus  on  the  amount  of forest  which  is  ultimately protected.  In
scenario c, we  indeed assume deforestation prevention becomes nearly free after 2050 ($10 per hectare
and per year at most). As a result, the turning point comes back from 2040 to 2030 and the surface under
protection doubles.
Threshold  discount  rate  Abatement  and  Turning  point  Surface
sequestration  protected  from
costs  deforestation
550  5%  a  2040  39  Mha
500  5%  a  2025  89  Mha
450  5%  a  2005  170  Mha
550  3%  a  2035  41 Mha
550  5%  b  2045  19 Mha
550  5%  c  2030  66  Mha
Tablel: Date at which deforestation  prevention  begins and surface ultimately  protected  from deforestation  with threshold
damages.  a: abatement  and sequestration  costs  assumptions  made  in the text, b: backstop  technology  price divided  by  four in 50
years instead  of two;  c: sequestration  virtuallyfree  beyond  2050  ($10/halyr).
We have  demonstrated that  at  the  root  of this  "bang-bang"  dynamics  is the  fact that  discounted
marginal abatement costs and discounted marginal costs of permanent sequestration cannot be equalized
over more than one period. We verify this property numerically. Figure 4 shows the discounted shadow
price of carbon (continuous line) and the discounted marginal costs  of permanent sequestration (black
squares). We see that the former increases with time (at rate 5) over the 2000-2060 period while the latter,
15decreases.  Before  2040  ("turning  point"),  sequestration  costs  more  at  the  margin,  and  there  is  no
sequestration at all. But after 2040, the reverse becomes true, and all the remaining land is protected.
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Figure 4: Discounted marginal fossil-fuel  (in continuous line) and sequestration (with black squares) abatement costs with
threshold damage function.
Polynomial damagefunctions
We start examining polynomial damage functions with the linear case. In this case, marginal damages
are positive from the start. And  as expected, we  now observe a much smoother  deforestation pattern:
prevention starts as early as in 2000, and gradually increases, some deforestation still takes place for a
few decades.  This  is shown  in Figure  5, where  the  continuous bold  line  represents  the  cumulative
deforested area in the business-as-usual scenario, and the line with black squares cumulative deforestation
with linear damages. We see that some forest is protected as early as in 2000, but cumulative deforested
area still rises during 20 years along the optimal path: this means that some clearing still takes place, or,
in other words, that some carbon is temporary sequestration between periods (about 4 Mha per period).
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Figure  5:  Cumulative  deforestation  in  the  baseline  scenario  (bold  line),  with  linear  damages  amounting  to  0.  5%  of  Gross
World Product  ifconcentration  reaches  550 ppm  in 21 00  (black  triangles),  and to  I1% of Gross  World  Product  (black  squares).
16Figure  6  shows  the  discounted  marginal  permanent  sequestration  costs  (black  squares)  and  the
marginal fossil fuel abatement costs (continuous  line). It  confirms that, with  linear  damage function,
marginal damages at  low concentration levels are now  high enough to trigger  decreasing discounted
marginal  abatement  costs.  Consequently,  marginal  (permanent)  sequestration  costs  and  marginal
abatement costs can now be equated (cf. equation 22), at least until 2020. After 2020 however, we reach
the point where the required marginal cost of abatement in the fossil-fuel sector is so great that it exceeds
the  marginal cost  of protecting (forever)  all the  remaining  standing forest.  Marginal  abatement and
sequestration costs thus cannot be equated anymore.
We find this general pattern to be robust to the variation of several parameters (damage levels, discount
rates or marginal abatement costs). The surface of forest which is ultimately protected, however, varies
significantly with those (as  can be seen, for example,  in Figure 5 above, where  the line with square
triangles represent the optimal deforestation path when expected damages when concentration reach 550
ppm are divided by two).
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Figure 6: Discounted marginal fossil-fuel  (in continuous line) and sequestration (with black squares) abatement costs with
linear damage function.
If we move toward damage functions of higher polynomial degrees, we observe a shift towards the
"bang-bang"  solution. This  evolution comes from  the  fact that,  the  higher the  exponent, the  lower
marginal damages become  at  low concentration levels. Figure 7 below  illustrates this  mechanism.  It
shows  the  discounted  shadow  price  of  carbon  with  linear,  quadratic  and  cubic  damage  functions
respectively (the amount of damage at 550 ppm is adjusted to 0.5%, 1% and 1.5% respectively so as to
ensure  initial shadow  prices  are of  the  same  order of  magnitude).  We  see  that  the  discounted the
discounted shadow price of carbon decreases from the start in the linear case. On the contrary, it first rises
and then curves back with cubic damage functions. The quadratic case is in between, the dynamics of the
shadow price of carbon strongly dependent on the value of the other parameters of the model.
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Figure  7: Discounted abatement costs with linear  (square), quadratic (triangles) and  cubic  (crosses) damage functions.
Damages at 550 ppm have been set to 0.5%, 0.9% and 1.5% of World Gross Product respectively so as to ensure similar initial
abatement costs.
To sum up these numerical findings, let us take a different angle and assume we have the possibility to
undertake a  30-year  long  sequestration project, knowing that  it may  not  be  extended. Under  which
circumstances should it be undertaken? Previous results show us that:
*  If  one  believes  there  is  limited or no  damage  at  low  concentration  level  (for  instance  with
"threshold"  or cubic damage functions), then  this  30-year long  sequestration  project is not cost-
effective for climate change mitigation, at any positive cost
*  On the contrary, if one believes in high marginal damages at low concentration levels (for instance
with linear damage function) then the project should be undertaken provided its cost are lower than
the gains in terms of price of atmospheric carbon (about $4.5 per tons of carbon in the case displayed
on Figure 7).
*  If one believes in quadratic damage functions, then the project may be undertaken, again provided
its costs are less than the gains in terms of price of atmospheric carbon (less than $2 per tons  of
carbon in Figure 7). In this limit case however, the cost-effectiveness of the sequestration project is
likely to be strongly dependent on the value of other parameters.
If there was some even some slight chance that the project were to be permanent, then it might still be
cost-effective even in the first and third cases. The computation of the expected costs and benefits are,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
187.  The afforestation case
In the previous sections,  we have focused  on deforestation  prevention.  We now demonstrate  that our
results  still hold  when considering  afforestation  or reforestation  activities.  In 7.1, we demonstrate  that any
afforestation  activity  can be regarded  as a combination  of elementary  projects  which are equivalent,  as far
as emissions  is concerned,  to deforestation  prevention  activities.  We then exploit  this analogy  to derive
the optimal  path of afforestation  or reforestation  within  a global  mitigation  strategy.
7.1.  Plantations  as a combination  of elementary  sequestration  projects
We consider  the case of a tree plantation  over a previously  non forested area. We assume  that this
plantation  is managed so as to reach as rapidly  as possible an equilibrium  state where there is an equal
number  of trees in each age vintage.  From this point  onward,  the forest net emissions  are zero as logging
is exactly  compensated  by regrowth.  This plantation  thus sequesters  carbon  only during  the interim  period
before  the equilibrium  is established.  Let us denote  p the length  of this transition  in periods,  and 'lo,  -- ,
Ilp  the incremental  quantity of carbon which is sequestered  at each period between establishment  and
equilibrium.  We denote i  the sum of all these coefficients,  which represents  the carbon  density of the
plantation  at equilibrium.
Let to  be the period  at which the plantation  is established,  and t, be the period  at which it is abandoned
(we assume  the trees are then logged,  and all the carbon released in the atmosphere,  except if t,=T, in
which case  carbon  remains  sequestered  forever).  For simplicity's  sake,  we also assume  that the plantation
is abandoned  after equilibrium  has been  reached,  i.e.  that period  t, is posterior  to to+p.
The important  point here is that the above afforestation  project can be regarded  as a combination  of
p+l  elementary  projects. The first one postpones  the emission  of 'lo tons of carbon from period to to
period  ti. The second  postpones  the emission  of 11 tons of carbon  from to+  I to t1, etc. And postpones  the
emission  of rp tons of carbon from to+p  to tl. With regard  to the climate, each of these elementary  is
equivalent  to a deforestation  prevention  project.
As a result, we see that the rules governing  the optimal use of afforestation  in a global mitigation
strategy  are similar  to those governing  deforestation  prevention" 5. These  rules are detailed  in 7.2 below.
7.2.  Insights  on the optimal  plantation  path in a climate  strategy
First, if the plantations  are permanent (i.e. tl=T, a case similar to the one studied in section 3), the
optimal use of afforestation  is given by (23). The difference  with (8) stems from the fact that in the
afforestation  case, carbon is captured  progressively  over periods (while in the deforestation  prevention
case,  all the carbon  is already  there in the trees).  Consequently,  the weighted  sum of future  shadow  prices
of carbon  must now  be considered.
p
CLI(ft)  =  l1 1lq  XqO4  (23)
q=O
The only difference  comes from the combination  effect. We do not consider  the shadow  prices of atmospheric  carbon
at periods to and t, anymore, but the difference  between the shadow price at period t,  and a weighted average of the
shadow prices over periods to, to+l, ... , to+p,  with weights precisely equal to the ratio of r1t/r1  times the discount factor
(except if the plantation is cleared before  reaching equilibrium,  where we consider  the weighted average of shadow prices
over interval  to,tl).
19Second, if plantations are temporary (i.e. tc<'T,  a case similar to the one studied in section 4), marginal
sequestration follows rule (24) below. With regard to (13) above, we see that, at equal carbon density per
hectare Ti, marginal plantation costs should be higher than marginal deforestation prevention costs ii the
shadow price of carbon rises at a rate higher than the rate of discount between periods t and t+p, hence
with  low marginal damages at  low concentration levels. On the other hand, marginal plantation  costs
should be lower than marginal deforestation prevention costs if marginal damages at low concentration
levels are highl6.
p
CLt(ft) =  3 [  Tlq  Xq  oq _ Tl AOT- t]  (24)
q=O
Let us third consider  the optimalforestation  path of a unique  body offorest where the planner should
pay at each period for protecting the plantations, at a price positively correlated with the total afforested
area F 1 (case similar to the one studied in section 5). Again, we obtain two polar sequestration patterns.
When the shadow price of atmospheric carbon rises at a rate higher than  the rate of discount, optimal
plantation is "bang-bang". No forest is planted at first, then, beyond some turning point, plantation starts.
On the other hand, if the price of atrnospheric carbon rises at a rate lower than the rate of discount, then
plantation starts from the start 17.
16  A difference  with deforestation  prevention  is that,  while one cannot  prevent prevention  on more hectares  than it wc,uld
occur in the baseline, there is a priori no such physical limit to the surface afforested.  However, if there is no more need
for a constraint  similar  to 4, the spatial  limitation  on the extent  of plantations  is now  embedded  into  the sequestration  cost
functions CL,.
17 It might be  argued, however, that the  model of  section 5 should not be  transposed to plantation. Contrary to
deforestation prevention,  plantations may indeed generate internal revenues and become sustainable in the long run (the
role of the planner  being simply  to help starting  the project  by funding establishment  costs for instance).  This may actually
be true also for deforestation  prevention. For example, households could be provided with alternative  job opportunities
which  generate  revenues  and  become  sustainable  in  the long  run.
Nevertheless, beyond some limit, it appears difficult to discard the possibility that global land scarcity might trigger
increasing land-use competition and therefore raise sequestration  costs. To put it another way, behind any model which
assumes sequestration  costs depend only on the incremental  surface forested  stands the implicit but necessary  assumption
that  the total  supply  of land for sequestration  available  over  all periods  is below  some  kind of acceptability  limit  beyond
which competition  for land-use  would become  too fierce.
208.  Conclusion
How should the risk of non permanence  affect decision about carbon sequestration?  The long-term
climate policy optimization  model we have developed  in this paper yields three main insights on this
question:
*  When permanence  can be guaranteed,  sequestration  is equivalent  to abatement  from fossil fuel
combustion.  Where it is impossible  to  guarantee  permanence  of  individual projects, it may be
possible  to apply  the same  reasoning  to portfolios  of projects,  adjusted  for the expected  proportion  of
nonpermanent  projects.
*  Explicit contracts for temporary sequestration,  on the other hand, make sense only when the
rationale  for mitigation  is reduction  of damages,  and current  marginal  damages  of climate  change  are
thought to be significant:  sequestration  is then cost-effective  because it postpone  damages.  In this
case, there's a rationale to begin temporary sequestration  contracts immediately,  and they will
probably  be renewed  indefinitely.
*  Such temporary sequestration  contracts also make sense when the rationale for mitigation is
keeping concentration  below some threshold,  but only when concentrations  are approaching  that
threshold.  Here  the sequestration  project serves  to bridge  the "hump" of high energy  abatement  costs.
Under this rationale,  sequestration  follows  a "bang-bang"  optimal  dynamics,  and begins immediately
only if the goal is to stabilize  at  very low concentration  levels.
Our analysis  thus limits the scope of the "buying  time" argument  for temporary  sequestration.  We see
in particular  that the key parameter  for the dynamics  of sequestration  is the shape of the climate change
damage function, and not the expectations  about technical change. One would have to be extremely
optimistic  about diffusion  of non-carbon  energy  technologies  over the next few decades  to justify current
sequestration  as a bridge  to these  technologies.
However,  this analysis  does not rule out the usefulness  of temporary  sequestration  projects  on broader
grounds.  First, in the Kyoto context,  it may make sense to bundle  temporary  sequestration  projects  with
follow-on  permanent  abatement projects,  depending  on the expected-price  path of carbon  - which will
depend  on the rules governing  each  successive  commitment  period  - and the acceptability  of this proposal
under  the Protocol  (Chomitz  2000). Secondly,  temporary  sequestration  projects  may be justifiable if they
have  a nonzero  chance  of bringing  about  permanent  change,  e.g. by diffusing  more carbon-absorbing  land
management practices. Third, one  could also  imagine policies that  substituted cheap temporary
sequestration  for more expensive energy-based  abatement, and invested the savings in research and
development  on carbon  mitigation  technologies.  A model  where technical  change  is endogenous  would  be
necessary  to examine  this question.  Last, if we drop our assumption  that the planner operates  with full
knowledge  of future  baselines,  climate  change  impacts  and technologies,  temporary  sequestration  projects
might  have  a value  in saving  time to gain information.  These  are areas  for future  research.
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23Annex 1:  Optimal climate policy with permanent sequestration
The Lagrangian for  problem  (1)-(7) is given below.  Kt,  a,,  Xt, it  and  X, are Lagrange  multipliers
associated with constraints (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) respectively. Xt can be interpreted as the spot shadow
price of atmospheric carbon' 8.
T  T-l
L =  - E  [CQ(at)  + CL,(f,)  + D,(M,)] O t+  E  t Ot  0[M+,-(l-8)  Mt-,  (e+elt-at-ii ft)]
t-_0  t=O
T  T  T  T
+ E ic.  0' at + 2; At 0'(et-at)  + E, Xt  Ot  ft + E  4t Ot  (dt-ft)  (al)
t-O  tV=  t7=0  t=O
First order conditions for problem are as follows. First, Lagrange multipliers Kt, (Y,,  X,  and  ,t  associated
with inequality constraints are positive or zero, and strictly positive only if the corresponding constraint is
binding. Second, partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to all variables are zero.
Let  us  start  by  fossil-fuel  abatement. Equation  (a2)  states that  along  the  optimal  path,  when  the
abatement is strictly positive but does not offset all the emissions, i.e. when Langrange multipliers Kt and
a, are zero, marginal abatement costs are equal to the shadow price of carbon scaled down by parameter ,B
to take into account instantaneous carbon uptake. There is of course no incentive to abate during the last
period T (a3)] 9. We come back to this border effect below.
aL
aL _ 0  =>  Ct(a,)  = St 4 + (Kt -at)  for 0 < t <T-1  (a2)
aL dL  _ o  CT(aT)  = KT  - UT  =>  aT  =  (a3)
aaT
Marginal sequestration costs follow exactly the same conditions (a4-a5). The average carbon content
per hectare  l in equation (a4) simply translates costs of carbon (in monetary unit per quantity of carbon)
into costs of land (in monetary unit per surface of land). Eliminating Xt in equations (a2) and (a4) and
assuming none of the constraints is binding yield equalization of marginal abatement costs and marginal
sequestration costs (8).
OL
df- =  =0  CLt(ft)  =  Xt Ti  D + (Xt - e)  for O  < t:  <T- I  (a4)
EL=  CLT(fT) =  XT - 'T  fT =  0 (a5)
The  dynamics of  model  (1)-(7) is  therefore  governed  by  the  variations  of  the  shadow price  of
atmospheric carbon  Xt  given in (a6) and (a7) below. By backward induction, equations (a6) and  (a7)
define a unique trajectory of carbon price, which in turns define a  unique trajectory of abatement and
sequestration.
" It would have been possible in theory to eliminate concentration  from the objective  function by replacing M, with its
value, a function of ao,  ...,  at, and fo,  f, l. We avoid this fastidious operation by considering  M, (I<t￿T)  as variables
constrained  by the carbon cycle (6).
t9 By definition of Lagrange multipliers,  KCT  aT = 0 and OTŽO.  If aT  were strictly positive, then KT would be zero. By
equation (a3), we would then have negative marginal  abatement costs, which is impossible by definition of functions C.
Consequently,  aT=O.
24aM =°  =>  Xt-I6)  1-  l6  >  St-l = 0 (l-o)  )4 + 0 Dt(Mt) (1 < t <T-1)  (a6)
aL =0  XT- = DT(MT)  f  (a7)
As indicated in 2.4, we choose T so that concentration at this period is back to current level even in the
baseline emission scenario. Any abatement prior to this date will only make concentration come back to
its current level more  rapidly.  As we  also assumed  marginal damages  would  be lower  than  current
marginal damages, we obtain that the discounted shadow price of carbon is (far) lower at period T- I than
it is today, i.e. OT-1 XT.I  < X0 (see footnote 13). Consequently, the discounted shadow price of carbon will
eventually start decreasing at some future point of time.
Annex  2:  Optimal  climate  policy  with  temporary  sequestration
Using the same notations as in annex 1, the Lagrangian for problem (1,2,3,4,6,7,10,11) is:
T  r-1
L =  - E  [Ct(at)  + CLt(ft)  + Dt(Mj)]  Ot  +  E  At  Ot  [Mt+±-  (1-6)  Mt-t (et+elt-at-i ft)]
t-o  t=o0
T-1
+  O  X'  et [Mt+ 1-(l -6) Mt-I3  (et+elt-at-iq  ft+l  ft.,)]
T  T  T  T
+  Ect  Ot  at + I  cat  0t (et-at)  + E  Xt  Ot  ft + E  it O (dt-ft)  (a8)
P=O  P=O  t=O  t=O
First order conditions are identical to the ones obtained in annex 1 above, with the exception of partial
derivatives  with regard  to ft, which now assume  three different  expressions  depending  on the value of t.
Like (a5) above, equation (al 1) simply translates the fact that there is no incentive to act at the last period.
For the X preceding periods, sequestration appears "permanent" for the planner, as carbon would only be
released beyond horizon T. The first order equation governing sequestration for these last periods (al 0) is
therefore identical to the one obtained in the permanent sequestration case (a4).
aL  %  L(t  =(  t+,  0 ) il D + (Xt - 4t)  for 0 < t <T-r- I  (a9)
aft
-=0  o  Cft)  = Xt  n  P + (xt -t0  for T-c < t <T-1  (alO)
aL -=0  CLT(fT)  = XT  - T  >  fT =  °  (al 1)
The results given in section 4 follow. Indeed, for all periods before T-c, which constitute most of the
periods if we assume T to be large and r to be small with regard to T, the optimal use of sequestration
depend on the difference between the discounted value of carbon when it is sequestered and when it is
released (equation a9). Precisely, if Xt - 2t+,0T  < 0 - i.e. if the shadow price  of carbon grows at  a rate
higher than the rate of discount between periods t and t+-- - then  X, must become strictly positive to
ensure that marginal sequestration costs do not become negative. Which means, by definition of Lagrange
multiplier X,  that fe=°:  no sequestration is undertaken. On the contrary, if X  ,  - X,+.0 > 0 - i.e. if the shadow
25value of atmospheric carbon grows at a rate lower than the rate of discount between t and t+r  - then ft
becomes  positive:  temporary  sequestration  is  used  along  the  optimal  path.  This  distinction  is
straightforward: temporary sequestering carbon is indeed cost-effective if and only if, at the margin, the
value of one ton emitted later is lower (in discounted terms) than the value of one ton emitted now.
Annex 3:  Optimal climate policy with both permanent and temporary sequestration
The Lagrangian for problem (1,2,3,5,6,18,19,20) is given below. Lagrange multipliers Xt  are associated
with constraints (19).
T  t  T-1
L =-  [Ct(a,)  + CL,(  Efq) + D,(Mt)]  Ot  + E  Xt  Ot  [Mt, 4 -(I-8)  M-P (et+elta,-rq  ft)]
t=o  q=o  t-=o
T  T  T  t  T
+  E  K,  Ot  at + E  u, 0t(et-at)  +  Xt  0*.  fq  +  E  e tEt (dt-ft)  (al2)
t'=O  t=O  t  =0  t=O
First order conditions are again identical to the ones obtained in the permanent sequestration case, with
exception of the derivatives relative to the amount of land preserved from deforestation ft.
aL  ~~T  q-=  tT  T  o-
aft= 0  =>  E  CLq(Fq)  P3-  B  +  [Y  Xq  Oqtjt  for 0 < t <T-1  (al3)
q-qt  q t
aL =0  =>  CLT(fT)  = XT - tT  fT =  0  (a14)
afT
The dynamics of sequestration is governed by equation (al3)  which  states that, when constraints (3)
and (4) are not binding, the marginal cost of protecting one additional hectare of forest at each period
from period t to horizon T - that is the marginal cost of permanent sequestration - should be equal to the
shadow price of carbon (weighted by ,B  and by the carbon per hectare ratio  1). Again, the dynamics of
sequestration depends on whether the shadow price of carbon grows at a rate higher or lower than the
discount rate, which can be seen by "differentiating" equation (al 3).
CLt(F,) = (X - 0 X,+ 1) ri  D  + %t  + [E,+I  0 - it]  (al5)
What does this equation imply for the evolution of sequestration? Let us first assume that 2t grows at a
rate strictly higher than the rate of discount between periods t and t+1 (i.e. that  kt  - 0 Xt+1  < 0). Under this
assumption, equation (al5)  requires the term Xt  + [4,1 0 - i]  to be strictly positive, which occurs in two
cases:
(i)  i,1=O and Xt>, that is when no forest is protected at all at period t (F,=O,  which implies Xt>O 20) and
when not all forest is protected at period t+1 (f,+ 1<dt+ 1, which implies 4,i=°).
(ii)  t,+.0  - 4t>0, that is when all possible forest is protected at period t+l  (f,+i=d,+ 1, which implies
4t+l=0).  Note that in this case, we have obviously Xt±l=O,  which implies that for equation (al5)  to
hold at time t+l, it is necessary that  ,t+2  0 - 4t+1> 0.
Rules (i) and (ii) define the dynamics of At  for the period where the shadow price of carbon grow  s at a
rate strictly higher than the rate of discount. Three evolutions are indeed possible:
20 The fact that no forest at all is protected at period  t obviously implies that the incremental  amount of forest protected
at period t is zero (ft=O).  Hence f,<d,  and t,=O.
26*  no sequestration at all along this period (ft=O  all along the period): we are always in case (i).
*  some sequestration at first period (fo>O)  and full sequestration from period  I onward: we are in
case (ii) from the start.
*  or no sequestration until period t (ft=O  for all t<t), and full after period t (ft=dt for all t>t): we are in
case (i) until period t- 1 and in case (ii) afterwards.
Now when the shadow price of carbon starts growing less rapidly than the rate of discount (which we
know it will eventually), i.e. when Xt - 0 X,+ 1 > 0, it is necessary that there  is some sequestration for
equation (al 5) to hold (if indeed F, were zero, the left hand side of the equation would be zero, while the
right  hand  side  would  be  strictly positive).  Whether there  is full  sequestration  or not,  i.e.  whether
constraint (19) is binding depends on the supply of forest, of the marginal sequestration costs, and on the
speed at which discounted price of atmospheric carbon diminishes.
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